Anticipation: Beyond synthetic biology and cognitive robotics  by Nasuto, Slawomir J. & Hayashi, Yoshikatsu
AS
B
a
A
R
R
A
A
K
A
C
E
E
A
1
t
f
b
l
a
s
r
t
p
f
p
t
t
t
w
u
s
h
0BioSystems 148 (2016) 22–31
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
BioSystems
jo u r n al homep age: www.elsev ier .com/ locate /b iosystems
nticipation:  Beyond  synthetic  biology  and  cognitive  robotics
lawomir  J.  Nasuto ∗, Yoshikatsu  Hayashi
rain Embodiment Laboratory, School of Systems Engineering, University of Reading, Reading RG 6AY, United Kingdom
 r  t  i  c  l e  i  n  f  o
rticle history:
eceived 3 June 2015
eceived in revised form 25 July 2016
ccepted 31 July 2016
vailable online 2 August 2016
eywords:
nticipation
ognitive robotics
mbodied cognition
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
The  aim  of  this  paper  is to propose  that  current  robotic  technologies  cannot  have  intentional  states  any
more  than  is feasible  within  the  sensorimotor  variant  of  embodied  cognition.  It argues  that  anticipation
is  an  emerging  concept  that  can  provide  a bridge  between  both  the  deepest  philosophical  theories  about
the nature  of  life  and  cognition  and  the empirical  biological  and  cognitive  sciences  steeped  in reductionist
and  Newtonian  conceptions  of causality.
The paper  advocates  that  in  order  to  move  forward, cognitive  robotics  needs  to  embrace  new  plat-
forms  and  a conceptual  framework  that  will  enable  it to pursue,  in  a meaningful  way,  questions  about
autonomy  and  purposeful  behaviour.  We  suggest  that  hybrid  systems,  part  robotic  and  part  cultures  of
neurones,  offer  experimental  platforms  where  different  dimensions  of  enactivism  (sensorimotor,  con-nactivism
nimats
stitutive  foundations  of biological  autonomy,  including  anticipation),  and  their  relative  contributions  to
cognition,  can  be  investigated  in an integrated  way.
A  careful  progression,  mindful  to  the  deep  philosophical  concerns  but  also  respecting  empirical  evi-
dence,  will  ultimately  lead  towards  unifying  theoretical  and  empirical  biological  sciences  and  may  offer
advancement  where  reductionist  sciences  have  been  so  far faltering.
ublis© 2016  The  Authors.  P
. Introduction
The debate on the nature of cognition and the mechanisms
hat support it has been at the heart of one of the most pro-
ound areas of human inquiry. Some researchers and philosophers
elieve that there is a fundamental link between cognition and
iving (Thompson, 2007). As opposed to inanimate objects, which
re passive recipients of external forces and disturbances, living
ystems seem to be characterised by their ability to act in the envi-
onment in a way that suggests goal-oriented behaviour. One of
he characteristics that seem to be underpinning intentional and
urposeful behaviour is an ability to act, taking into consideration
uture events.
Accounting for such intentional states, however, has been very
roblematic in traditional science, which is mostly dominated by
he reductionist and Newtonian conception of causality, implying
hat physical laws admit state changes of physical objects only on
he basis of past and current state. Causality understood in this
ay has been a sacro-sanct postulate in physics and, following its
ndeniable successes, has become a broadly accepted axiom across
ciences.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: s.j.nasuto@reading.ac.uk (S.J. Nasuto).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biosystems.2016.07.011
303-2647/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open access hed  by Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY
license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Thus, teleology has been largely eliminated, at least from bio-
logical sciences, and some thinkers would even go as far as to deny
goal-directedness of cognitive agents like ourselves. Others adhere
to a computational view of cognition which, consistently with sci-
entiﬁc position (currently accepted conception of computing is a
classically causal mechanistic paradigm), deems the ‘hard problem’
as simply non-existent, (Dennett, 1996), or as a mere consequence
of sufﬁcient ‘complexity’ and computational power.
Enactive and embodied cognition propose that the computa-
tional account misses an important constituent, the embodiment
in lived and living body, in order to provide a full account of mind
states.
In response to the dissatisfaction with the purely computational
accounts, the next generation of AI efforts broadly subscribing to
embodied cognition consider augmentation of the traditional com-
puting paradigm (discrete, symbolic) with robotic hardware body
(amounting to analogue, continuous computing), as possessing suf-
ﬁcient explanatory power, at least in principle (O’Reagan, 2007;
Haikonen, 2012).
Cognitive robotics has invigorated the enthusiasm in studying
and perhaps even recreating at least certain aspects of cognition
in purely man-made systems. This growing interest may  be partly
explained by the seeming balance struck by cognitive robotics. On
the one hand it sits well in the embodied cognition framework,
whereby sensorimotor accounts offer a natural conceptual frame-
work and justiﬁcation for this approach. On the other hand, it is still
article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
BioSys
ﬁ
a
i
t
q
l
s
H
w
t
c
n
f
w
b
d
t
t
r
a
R
t
n
n
r
o
o
m
a
a
a
m
o
i
t
r
l
a
u
c
t
t
2
i
w
m
l
t
r
f
i
a
e
d
l
w
n
a
oS.J. Nasuto, Y. Hayashi / 
rmly tied to hard sciences, thus offering an opportunity to study
nd understand cognitive processes within an analytic framework.
However, the only truly cognitive system we know of are biolog-
cal living organisms; an observation which would seem to suggest
hat the only approaches that can elucidate the most fundamental
uestions about the nature of life and cognition must involve bio-
ogical, neuroscience and cognitive sciences. On that view robotic
ystems can never, in principle, offer satisfactory explanations.
ence, on this account, a cognitive robotics programme must fail
here neurobiology and cognitive science prevail.
Nevertheless, the position put forward in this paper is more sub-
le. Both cognitive robotics and much of natural science share a
ommon philosophical framework tantamount to a very mecha-
istic view of the world. We  propose that this commonly inherited
ramework underlies common difﬁculties any of these approaches
ould have, when trying to provide an account of autonomous
ehaviour or intentionality. This is because there seems to be a
eep chasm between our system of knowledge based on tradi-
ional science and our subjective experience, in light of which
he ability to anticipate the future, and act on it, appears to be a
ather basic property of agency in general and speciﬁcally of human
gency.
We propose, largely following theoretical biologist Robert
osen, that anticipation is one of the most fundamental charac-
eristics of living, cognitive systems and that its proper account
ecessitates reframing the usual notions of causality and mecha-
ism. In fact, although on the surface it may  seem that anticipation
equires the presence of a sophisticated cognitive system, forms
f anticipatory behaviour have been observed even in unicellular
rganisms. It is altogether not too surprising, because the ability to
odify behaviour in anticipation of the future may  offer an adaptive
dvantage to organisms possessing it, thus may  putatively playing
 role in evolution.
In consequence, two questions arise. Firstly, what processes
llow for anticipation to occur? And secondly, are there any com-
on  principles underpinning anticipation across different levels of
rganisms’ complexity? Understanding such processes is interest-
ng from a fundamental perspective as it may  shed further light on
he relationship between life and cognition and also for pragmatic
easons, as it may  help us in constructing artifacts with an increased
evel of autonomy and robustness.
This paper will review some evidence pointing to processes
nd principles that may  offer promising ﬁrst steps towards our
nderstanding of how anticipation could be realised in biologi-
al organisms. Moreover, they could help to reconcile much of
raditional science with the notion of anticipation, following in
he footsteps of researchers such as Rosen (2012), Louie (2010,
012), and others, who  laid the foundations for our understand-
ng of anticipation. Hence, the answer to the original question of
hether cognitive robotics or biological and cognitive sciences are
ore suited to characterise the most fundamental properties of
iving systems is neither of them, as long as they remain conﬁned
o the mechanistic explanations. Although it seems that cognitive
obotics is thus bound to fail, more recent developments in the
orm of hybrid systems, animats, constituted by cultures of biolog-
cal neurones embedded in a closed loop in robotic bodies, offer
 possible way forward whereby robotics may  still be relevant to
lucidate such most fundamental issues.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 will
iscuss how cognitive robotics, building partly on Artiﬁcial Intel-
igence and partly on cybernetics, continuing the development
ithin sciences of tries to provide a mechanistic account of cog-
ition.
Section 3 will review some theories linking life, cognition and
nticipation. The next section, Section 4, will discuss the evidence
f anticipatory behaviour in organisms.tems 148 (2016) 22–31 23
An approach that may  help cognitive robotics to make steps
beyond its mechanistic conﬁnes, is to use animats, part-machine
part-biological hybrid entities. The animat platform is the focus
of the penultimate Section 5. The conclusions end the paper with
some caveats.
2. From scientiﬁc to cognitive robotics accounts of
cognition
The attempts to clarify the nature of processes underpinning life
and mind have often been pursued independently. This is especially
true within the traditional reductionist science paradigm, which
tries to isolate the properties in question and to understand them by
reducing the above to their primary components. However, in spite
of undeniable successes of modern science and medicine, these
two problems have so far deﬁed such an approach. It seems that
as soon as we start concentrating on individual components and
characterise their function mechanistically, we  loose sight of the
bigger picture and fail to notice that a mechanistic explanation may
not be able to account for the highest level of organisation. Thus,
within reductionist, mechanistic science paradigm we  are then left
with a dilemma – either accept that there is nothing more to living
or sentience than mere mechanisms (albeit complicated ones) or
abandon these questions altogether. The amalgamation of the two
stances has characterised the mainstream science position at least
since biology and psychology started to aspire to achieve the level
of mathematical rigour enjoyed in XIX century physics.
The mechanistic tradition was  somewhat continued in
approaches rooted in Alan Turing’s formalisation of computing
operations. Turing wanted to provide a mechanistic minimal deﬁni-
tion capturing the essence of operations performed by, then human,
computors engaged in highly repetitive tasks used at the time for
performing nontrivial calculations. A modern computer was born
of these efforts and the Turing Machine (TM) now provides one of
the most fundamental deﬁnitions of classical computing. The TM
was a reﬂection of the mere fact that the cognitive system’s (human
computor) ability to follow formal rules can be successfully encap-
sulated in such a minimal formal mechanism. When combined with
an enthusiastic belief that computers can compute anything worth
computing (aka Church-Turing hypothesis), this led to a conclu-
sion that the TM can account not only for cognitive system’s ability
of following formal rules but in fact for the entirety of cognition.
Basing cognition on the TM paradigm seemed to have offered a
step in the right direction, reuniting the science of human psyche
with hard sciences, as the TM presented a quintessentially mech-
anistic and reductive explanation. Thus, cognitive science and its
close cousin, artiﬁcial intelligence, incorporated the TM,  or formal
manipulations of symbol systems within their modus operandi. The
outcome of this was that the description (computation) of a very
speciﬁc phenomenon (formal rule following by humans) was con-
ﬂated with the phenomenon itself. Although, a distinction between
an object and its description is clear and unquestionable in almost
every other scientiﬁc domain, large part of cognitive science have
accepted this conﬂation without much reserve.
Such approaches were soon opposed by various thinkers who
were not satisﬁed with the perceived shortcomings of the formal
symbolic approach to explain fundamental properties of cogni-
tion. Many of such criticisms grew out of methods, which at the
height of its popularity were the domain of cybernetics, or which
later could trace their heritage to cybernetic movement. The critics
emphasised the importance of continuous time and state space evo-
lution, and decentralised nature of biological processing; features
which were at odds with the computational paradigm. Yet, impor-
tant caveats as they were, they did not address the fundamental
shortcomings of the computational symbolic account as discussed
2 BioSys
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t length in the seminal work of Searle on an infamous Chinese
oom argument (Searle, 1980). The ensuing heated debate con-
inued for years, as evidenced in Preston and Bishop (2002), with
either Searle nor his opponents able to convince the antagonists
o accept their arguments.
The reason for such a failure might have been that computer
cience and cybernetics grew out of the same scientiﬁc milieu – an
ttempt to provide a general framework, which nevertheless fell
ack on the traditional scientiﬁc account based on reductionism
nd classical mechanistic explanation rooted in Newtonian take on
ausality.
Similarly, further objections in the form of a ‘robotic reply’, as
resaged by Searle, did not fare any better against Searle’s rebuttals.
hese debates were still framed in a very computational frame-
ork.
More recently, the cognitive robotics agenda received more sup-
ort in the form of a growing movement in cognitive science,
nactivism, recognising that strict cognitivism is not satisfactory
nd that the biological body may  play an important role in cog-
itive processes. Enactivism is not a unitary position, with the
mount of emphasis on how important the body is and what role
t plays in cognition being one of the differentiating characteris-
ics of its various forms. Cognitive robotics seems to gain particular
raction with a ﬂavour of enactivism, embodied cognition, which
roposes that “our ability to perceive not only depends on, but is
onstituted by our possession of [. . .]  sensorimotor knowledge”
Noe, 2004). The claims that “cognition relates to sensorimotor
nteractions rather than to material self-constructing processes”
Barandiaran and Moreno, 2006), and that “the structure of sensor-
motor contingencies” provides a link to Gibbsonian affordances
ere particularly appealing for cognitive robotics as they appeared
o furnish it with a grounding in modern cognitive science.
O’Reagan claims that a sensorimotor account provides a satisfac-
ory account of phenomenal experience that can be integrated with
traditional) higher order cognition to provide a complete account
f conscious experience (O’Reagan, 2007). As a consequence, we
hould be able to construct robots that are conscious.
Interestingly, recognition of the importance of body for active
xploration and inference has also led to conﬂuence of the embod-
ed cognition with predictive brain hypothesis, (Clark, 2015), which
rames the inference problem as an active process where brains
onstantly attempt to predict the sensory streams. One of the
trongest proponents of predictive brain and active inference
ypothesis is Friston et al. (2010). The predictive brain hypothesis
as also been extended to include some aspects of social cognition
Otten et al., 2016).
A number of approaches within the cognitive robotics com-
unity are consistent with the above mentioned developments
tressing the importance of prospection, (Vernon et al., 2015), pre-
iction, (Zambelli and Demiris, 2015), or active exploration via
einforcement learning, (Merrick, 2010), and curiosity-driven or
ctive learning (Forestier and Oudeyer, 2015).
However, the air of legitimacy offered to cognitive robotics
y sensorimotor or embodied prediction accounts is illusory. The
roblem is that embodied cognition that reduces body to a mere
hysical instantiation of sensory motor loops does not go deep
nough in acknowledging the importance and implications of the
iological embodiment for cognition. If the role of the biological
ody (including the nervous system and the brain) merely provides
 wet-ware implementation of the sensorimotor loops, one needs
o ask what in principle is the difference between such ‘patterns
n the structure of sensorimotor contingencies’ and any patterns
n sensory data. On this interpretation of embodied cognition the
ody amounts to a part of a sensorimotor closed loop between
eural activity responsible for bodily (motor) action and the acti-
ation of neural populations in the sensory areas resulting fromtems 148 (2016) 22–31
such an action. As the role of the body has been reduced to a con-
veyor of closed loop activity, the essence of the explanations resting
solely on sensorimotor loops must therefore be conﬁned to causal
interactions between motor and sensory neurone populations acti-
vated by the results of the actions instantiated by the sensorimotor
loop. But why  should such causal interactions between two  neu-
ral populations be any different from any other causal interactions
between other neural populations, e.g. between neurones in two
sensory modalities. If the operations of neurones can be explained
away with activation ﬂow via trains of action potentials (or any
other variable that is solely meant to be involved in neurone infor-
mation processing capacity), the causal interactions of the sensory
and motor neurones do not seem to have any privileged position in
comparison to analogous interactions between any other neuronal
populations. The other possibility is that other bio-physico-
chemical properties of a body, including the neurones supporting
the sensorimotor loop, must be somehow involved, such that the
operation of the sensorimotor loop is inexorably linked with the
biological (metabolic) makeup of cells constituting it.
Cognitive robotics stops where such restricted version of
embodied cognition does. By concentrating on providing a ground-
ing exclusively in the external world, it can capture its relational
structure, however, the same can be achieved by correlations and
look-up tables. Thus, cognitive robotics does not fare much better
than computational accounts. Adding extra sensors or actuators,
or even using different formalisms, be it symbolic, dynamical or
connectionist, to drive the robotic platforms’ closed loops, does not
improve the situation, as these simply result in different forms of
capturing the relational structure of the external world.
This may  be understood if one considers that the robotic embod-
iment of an otherwise computing machine, renders the entire
system a part analogue, part symbolic hybrid, and as such still falls
within a broad conception of computing (Spencer et al., 2013).
Similar concerns have been raised by Ziemke et al. (2014),
Ziemke and Thill (2014), who  inquires about ascribed (‘as if’) and
intrinsic intentionality. He claims, after Harnad, that cognitive
robotic research constitutes an extension of classical computational
functionalism to robotic functionalism. Thus, current robotic tech-
nology cannot really equip robots with true intrinsic intentionality,
unless one believes that strict sensorimotor theory provides its
satisfactory account.
Although the reservations discussed in previous paragraphs
have been leveled at accounts justifying cognitive robotics on
the basis of sensorimotor theory, they equally apply to cognitive
robotics systems that may  use predictive forward models in their
control. As Bickhard argued, (Bickhard, 2016), predictive computa-
tional theories cannot provide a full account of cognition in living
bodies, neither can they help cognitive robotics escape criticisms
of mechanical vacuity. As Nadin argues, prediction or expectation
do not equate to anticipation, (Nadin, 2013), and it is the latter that
holds special place in some theories of biological autonomy (Rosen,
2012; Bickhard, 2016). Moreover, in one of a few formal derivations
in this domain, Louie proved that anticipation is a necessary but not
a sufﬁcient characteristic of living systems (Louie, 2012). Thus, it is
not a mere matter of presence of anticipation (let alone prediction
or expectation) that solves the problem; it is how it is realised by
a system of appropriate complexity (it must, following Rosen and
Louie theory, also be impredicative, i.e. containing a closed path of
efﬁcient causation) that is at stake.
In contrast, even the simplest biological organisms have inter-
nal drives at all levels of organisation: organismic, metabolic
and physical. These make them act in the world, with such pro-
cesses constituting, driving and modulating activity of all building
blocks of the closed interaction loops in ways that result in such
sensorimotor interactions that will support immediate and delayed
fulﬁllment of the drives at all levels.
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Intentionality comes not only from the potential mapping
etween relational structures of the external world and the states of
iological constituents, but also from relation between such struc-
ures and internal drives and needs of an agent.
Systems that are based on formal manipulation of the inter-
al representations are thus neither intentional nor autonomous,
s no manipulation is internally driven nor serves an intrinsically
eaningful purpose other than that of the system’s designer.
. Life and cognition – from autopoiesis to anticipation
Apart from sensorimotor theory variant of embodied cogni-
ion or broadly construed enactivism, a number of theories have
ppeared, more often arising at the interface of philosophy, cogni-
ive science and theoretical biology, embracing the body as more
han a mere passive vessel rendering the computational mind with
nalogue computing capabilities. They posit that biology of the liv-
ng systems is inexorably linked with cognition and both require
 fundamentally different approach from a traditional mechanistic
ethodology, in order to provide their truly satisfactory explana-
ion. There are a number of such accounts and the ﬁeld is still quite
ragmented, because these efforts have been put to address speciﬁc
nd distinct problems and often stemmed from different ﬁelds. As
uch, they are defying a neat classiﬁcation in terms of the underly-
ng discipline, which is probably not surprising given that the prob-
em they tackle cuts across the traditional scientiﬁc domain silos.
In order to facilitate their discussion, the material in this sec-
ion is structured around different characteristics and the extent
o which relevant theories relate to them. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst
wo paragraphs attempt to draw readers’ attention to the broad
imilarities between enactive accounts and those rooted in the
onstitutive biological account of autonomy. The third and fourth
aragraphs introduce autopoietic enactivism of Maturana and
arela and theories of Bickhard, Deacon, Kauffman and Rosen pay-
ng particular attention to their respective roots and motivations as
ell as intellectual frameworks from which they arise. Introduced
n different contexts and for distinct reasons they are discussed at
ifferent levels of abstraction making it particularly challenging to
rovide a detailed account of their mutual relationships. Never-
heless, some commonalities and differences are discussed in the
emaining part of the section with respect to the different levels of
xplanation and complex structures invoked in these theories.
Autopoiesis, a characterisation of life developed in theoretical
iology by Maturana and Varela (1980), has been elaborated further
y Varela and his followers into what is now known as autopoietic
nactivism in cognitive science (Thompson, 2007). Mark Bickhard
eveloped his interactivist model within a philosophical frame-
ork consistent with his own process philosophy (Bickhard, 2016).
errence Deacon, dissatisﬁed with the inability of the physical and
iological approaches to account for the mental content and subjec-
ive experience, proposed a theory spanning biology, biosemiotics,
omplex systems and thermodynamics (Deacon, 2011). In con-
rast, theoretical biologist Stuart Kauffman, starting from the quest
o understand the origins of life, developed the theories based
n complex systems, metabolic regulation networks and thermo-
ynamical considerations and recognised the link between the
undamental properties of living systems and cognition, in the form
f autonomous agency (Kauffman, 2000).
Of particular interest in this paper is the work of Robert Rosen,
ho started formulating his own accounts of living systems using
he framework of relational biology (Rosen, 1991, 2012). His (M,R)-
ystem (metabolism and repair) is a relational model in which the
unctions of metabolism, repair and replication are “closed to efﬁ-
ient causation” – a property that seems analogous to Maturana
nd Varela’s organisational closure (Thompson, 2007). Whereastems 148 (2016) 22–31 25
Rosen’s (M,R)-system deﬁnition focused on properties of living sys-
tems related to Aristotelian material, efﬁcient and formal causes
(closure to efﬁcient causation), his other, more abstract model of
living, anticipatory system, was concerned with Aristotelian ﬁnal
cause. Thus, according to Rosen, anticipatory systems are systems
able to generate internal predictive models of themselves and their
environments and use them in order to prolong their existence. As
Kineman states in his contribution to the second edition of Rosen’s
seminal volume (Rosen, 2012), Rosen equated the (M,R)-systems
with anticipatory systems, although the work by Louie (2012), sug-
gests that the relationship between these models may  be more
involved and the (M,R)-systems can be anticipatory under some
speciﬁc conditions.
The above is not meant to be an exhaustive account of all
the approaches to characterise living systems nor does it reﬂect
the amount of further research elaborating the ideas put for-
ward by these pioneers. It also is beyond scope of this paper
to discuss in any depth these theories or their mutual relation-
ships. Even this brief account illustrates that the ﬁeld is still
quite fragmented and the individual positions are still often sub-
ject to change (for example there have been many different
ﬂavours of autopoietic enactivism, which itself is quite distinct
from the initial Maturana’s account). Thus, Ziemke discusses ﬁve
different types of embodiment: structural coupling, historical
embodiment, physical embodiment, organismoid embodiment and
organismic embodiment (Ziemke, 2001). Chemero’s distinction
between at least two  types of embodied theories; radical embod-
ied cognitive science committed to anti-representationalism and
anti-computationalism and the more widespread but more nar-
rowly understood sensorimotor account, is discussed in Ziemke
et al. (2014). As Froese points out (Froese and Sierra, 2015), in his
review of the recent monograph on modern sensorimotor theo-
ries, (Bishop and Martin, 2014), the initial sensorimotor theory of
O’Regan and Noë evolved into two  accounts championed by these
authors in later years, in addition to autopoietic enactivism or rad-
ical enactivism. As Froese states, more work is needed to provide a
detailed landscape of sensorimotor and enactive theories.
Moreover, all of the approaches discussed so far differ with
respect to the level of formalism with which they have been devel-
oped. Enactive formulations are often very general and not based on
a predeﬁned formalism. Similarly, Bickhard and Deacon formulate
their accounts in terms of general physical principles and biolog-
ical mechanisms. Kauffman based his thinking on notions from
thermodynamics and complex systems theory but also stated that
certain aspects are nonmathematisable. Rosen’s accounts are prob-
ably most formalised, in that relational biology relies heavily on
the category theory. Most of these accounts have been develop-
ing in relative isolation from each other, although more recently
some work on characterising their interrelationships has started to
emerge, e.g. Letelier et al. have discussed the relationship between
autopoiesis and (M,R) systems (Letelier et al., 2003).
Nevertheless, in spite of this fragmentation it is worth noting
some of the apparent similarities. All mentioned theories are rela-
tional in that they recognise that the fundamental properties of
biological systems depend on their speciﬁc organisation. For Bick-
hard this amounts to a requirement that a system is recursively
self-maintaining. Maturana and Varela emphasise the importance
of organisational closure, whereas for Rosen it is closure to efﬁ-
cient causation. Thus, all recognise the fundamental circularity of
the organisation of living systems and all agree on the inadequacy
of computational accounts of life and cognition.
All theorists invoke various complex systems’ structures in
order to specify such circular logic of life organisation. Rosen,
similarly to Maturana and Varela, concentrates on the biological
dimension of such structures consisting of metabolic, reconstruc-
tion (repair) reactions, whereas Bickhard, Deacon and Kauffman,
2 BioSys
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hile attentive to biological reality, emphasise also the complex
hysical phenomena driven by thermodynamic principles which
nderpin these biological processes. Both Kauffman and Deacon
ropose that a physical notion of work must play a fundamental
ole in the emergence of living systems, as the work is involved
n energy ﬂows between the system and its environment, and is
nly possible thanks to operating within certain constraints, which
nable the channeling of energy into a ‘useful’ form. The circular-
ty stems from the realisation that the very constraints needed for
ork to occur, in turn themselves can only come to existence via
ork. Bickhard maintains that at the fundamental level the liv-
ng systems are far from thermodynamic equilibrium systems of
 speciﬁc type, namely recursively self-maintenant systems. Dea-
on, consistent with Bickhard, pays a lot of attention to Aristotle
eﬁnitions of causality, and is concerned with explaining how life
merges from nonliving processes. Recognising the need to provide
n account of the Aristotelian ﬁnal cause, he proposed a hierarchy
f complex systems with thermodynamics at its base, in which each
ext level emerges from the lower level.
In different ways, and often using different language, these
esearchers agree on the inadequacy of classical science, based on
echanistic conception of causality and reductionism to account
or existence of sentient beings with subjective experiences. They
lso try to reconsider the concept of causality, pointing to circu-
ar causality of biological/living systems and anticipation emerging
rom such processes.
Bickhard perhaps most explicitly makes the link between low
evel physical processes and anticipation. His far from thermo-
ynamic equilibrium, recursively self-maintenant systems entail,
t the most basic level, a capacity for anticipation and hence
ormative function and these serve the perpetuation of the self-
aintenance of such systems (Bickhard, 2009). Thus, Bickhard
laces anticipation at the basis of the emergence of normativity and
ltimately representation, laying foundations for the subsequent
xplanation of sense making. Thus, normativity is a consequence
f symmetry breaking implied by the consequence of anticipation;
he system will perform an action that will support its mainte-
ance of far from equilibrium state or otherwise it will start falling
nto equilibrium, thus will cease to exist. Bickhard (2016), con-
rasted his interactivism with autopoietic enactivism. The thrust
f his critique is aimed at autopoietic enactivism as he contends
hat the focus on internal self-production in autopoiesis is not suf-
cient as a full account of life. This is a similar concern to that
aised by proponents of autopoietic enactivism about a focus on
perational closure in Varela’s early account of biological auton-
my  (Di Paolo and Thompson, 2014). While recognising similarities
etween the two theories, Bickhard also maintains that there are
mportant differences. Among other characteristics he contrasts his
pproach with the main characteristics of autopoietic enactivism
 operational closure, precariousness and irreducibility of phen-
menological experience. In autopoietic enactivism autonomy is
antamount to operational closure and precariousness. Bickhard
otes that autopoietic enactivism misses the essential character-
sation of living by not realising that both operational closure and
recariousness are constituted by far from equilibrium conditions.
oreover, he observes that precariousness is already a normat-
ve term and, in contrast to his interactivism, the theory does not
xplain how such normativity emerges. Observer-dependent nor-
ative descriptions, to which autopoietic enactivism is committed,
mplies the existence of a gap between experiential and nonex-
eriential, which can only be addressed by correlational methods
elating the ﬁrst and the third person descriptions. In contrast, his
ccount relates phenomenological and objective realms via various
orms of emergence.
Montevil and Mossio build on Rosen’s theory of biological orga-
isation and view autopoiesis similarly to Bickhard (Montvil andtems 148 (2016) 22–31
Mossio, 2015). In particular, they note its lack of articulation of a
distinction between biological closure and other forms of causal
cycles present in nature. Although their focus is ﬁrmly on the
roots of biological organisation and autonomy and hence they do
not discuss autopoietic enactivism explicitly, the latter inclusion
of precariousness as one of the deﬁning features does not escape
this objection, nor, being a normative term itself, does it allow for
naturalistic account of emergence of normativity. In contrast, as
Montevil and Mossio note, in his deﬁnition of (M,R)-systems, Rosen
recognised the need to account for balance between closure and
thermodynamic openness of biological organisation in considering
two causal regimes. They also note that Rosen’s formulation is very
abstract, which may  in part explain its relatively limited uptake.
Consistent with Bickhard’s insistence on grounding biological orga-
nisation in thermodynamics, Montevil and Mossio expand Rosen’s
construction by focusing on Kauffman’s concept of the work cycle
in which the circular relationship between work and constraints
allows for a directed release of energy (Kauffman, 2000).
It is important to reiterate that the preceding discussion of
Rosen’s theory is based on only one of his deﬁnitions of living
systems, (M,R)-systems, that explicated his views about the essen-
tial principles of biological organisation. It is his other deﬁnition
of living systems, anticipatory systems, that provides a comple-
mentary account of the same organisation. The link between them
has not been sufﬁciently explicated by Rosen and is often missed
or underappreciated. Rosen contended that Newtonian physics, on
which modern sciences are modelling their attempts at building
formal models of their respective domains, deals with mechanisms
which he considered simple systems. These, he contrasted with
the organisms, which in turn he considered as examples of com-
plex systems. Rosen’s deﬁning characteristics of complex systems
is an existence of closed path of efﬁcient causation. Thus, mech-
anisms, deﬁned in terms of material, formal and efﬁcient causes,
can only approximate, but never fully replicate, complex systems,
as the latter naturally entail the ﬁnal cause or anticipation – a
complex system may  accommodate a model of itself and/or of its
environment which it can use to modify its actions. In other words,
complex systems entail anticipatory systems. Similar position has
been expressed by Bickhard (2007). Even more interesting is a sim-
ilar admission from Bechtel, one of the staunchest proponents of
mechanistic explanation in biology (Bechtel, 2011). Speciﬁcally,
Bechtel admits that mechanistic explanation coached in terms of
sequential execution of operations may  not be sufﬁcient to account
for the capacity of living organisms to maintain their distinct iden-
tity; here, the capacity is predicated on the presence of various
feedback loops generating complex dynamics. He also states that
progress in understanding such systems will require augmenting
standard reductionist scientiﬁc methodology relying on decom-
posing the object of investigation into its constituent parts and
operations (collectively mechanisms) by synthetic approaches that
look back at the ‘whole’, perhaps using computer simulations.
Amongst the theoretical biologists concerned with character-
isation of life, Rosen was in a sense most radical in his thinking
as, not stopping at offering a critique of deﬁcient modern science’s
explanatory power, he suggested a reformulation of its foundations
by incorporating the Aristotelian notions of causality into its very
framework. He starts from the premise that we need to extend
our notion of causality used in scientiﬁc discourse to include the
ﬁnal cause in our descriptions of natural phenomena and consider
mechanistic causality only as a very special case. In this view, antic-
ipation becomes the most fundamental abstract characteristic of
living systems, a building block enabling us to distinguish them
in a systematic way from inanimate matter. For it is living sys-
tems that can drive their behaviour in anticipation of their futures,
thus incorporating the ﬁnal cause into their very essence, whereas
inanimate matter is not capable of such behaviour, its dynamics
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eing fully determined by the present state and interactions. Thus,
ccording to Rosen, physics, concerned with inanimate matter and
henomena, is a special case of such reformulated natural science
nd the extension going beyond physics can then include a proper
ccount of living and cognition. This is in stark contrast to the cur-
ently prevailing view that physics is the most fundamental of the
ciences with other sciences in principle, if not in practice, reducible
o it. Interestingly, Kauffman, with his idea of adjacent possible and
he ability of living systems to accommodate it in the way  that
s not mathematisable (at least within the framework of mecha-
istic Newtonian conception), (Kauffman, 2000), seems to grapple
ith similar ideas to those distilled by Rosen in his conception of
nticipatory systems and their implications.
For more information about the enactivism please see
Thompson, 2007; Bishop and Martin, 2014; Di Paolo and
hompson, 2014; Stapleton and Froese, 2016; Stapleton and
hompson, 2009; Stewart et al., 2010), and for theories of biological
utonomy the readers are referred to Letelier et al. (2011), Moreno
nd Mossio (2015). The next section will look at some evidence of
nticipatory behaviour in the animal world and some of the critical
valuation of its account provided within traditional science.
. Anticipation across scales
Theories of biological autonomy covered in Section 3 arise at the
ntersection of theoretical biology and philosophy. As such, they
ttempt to abstract away from speciﬁc examples of living systems
nd processes whilst trying to capture the overall principles and
elate them to natural laws. They are not concerned with explain-
ng or modelling speciﬁc phenomena encountered in the biological
orld, the latter constituting speciﬁc realisations. In this section the
mpirical evidence for anticipatory behaviour of biological orga-
isms will be discussed, with examples drawn from more standard
iological literature. Thus, the main aim of this section is not sim-
ly to motivate the theoretical models presented in Section 3, but
o provide evidence that anticipation has to be understood in a
ore fundamental way than the usual cognitive and computational
eaning of prediction or prospection ascribed to the term. Antici-
ation in its most basic form is a speciﬁc form of dynamical coupling
etween the system and its environment which can be observed
lready at a cellular level.
There is ample empirical evidence that organisms are using
nticipation in their everyday activities. Memories and actions
ften concern future events and this in turn requires some form of
nticipation. This has been recognised and studied in the psychol-
gy of both human and animal behaviour. In motor control studies,
t has been recognised for some time that in order to provide timely
nd accurate responses animals cannot rely on operating in reactive
ode only, due to the existence of noise and inevitable delays in
nformation transfer between sensory surfaces, brain and actuators.
his has been corroborated by the observation of early preparatory
ortical activity occurring up to several seconds before an onset
f voluntary action in the form of: so called bereitschaftspotential
BP), (Kornhuber and Deecke, 1965), event related desynchro-
isation/synchronisation (ERD/ERS), (Pfurtscheller and da Silva,
999), or more recently as dynamical reorganisation (Wairagkar
t al., 2014). Libet famously observed that such activity appears
ven prior to conscious intention to move, (Libet, 1985), a con-
lusion apparently supporting the deterministic and causal view
f action generation but sitting uncomfortably with a concept
f free will. The proposed solution for generation of appropri-
te motor commands was that the nervous system built so called
orward models of the body and of the world. It was these mod-
ls’ predictions that enabled precise goal-directed movements
o be executed (Shadmehr et al., 2010). There has been sincetems 148 (2016) 22–31 27
a proliferation of accounts proposing internal models for motor
control and trajectory planning including various control theo-
retic schemes seemingly supported by experiments coming from
neurophysiological, imaging and behavioural studies (Kawato,
1999).
In fact, the need to account for prediction and internal models
extends beyond mere motor control. As mentioned in Shadmehr
et al. (2010), the idea that our perceptions are a result of com-
bining evidence (sensory information) with prior beliefs about the
state of matter, was considered already by Kant. Cognitive scientists
came up with a taxonomy of different forms of ‘orienting towards
the future’ (e.g. prediction, anticipation, expectation, prospection),
(Nadin, 2013), that can be distinguished in cognitive processes
and different dimensions along which predictive behaviour can
be classiﬁed (Bubic et al., 2010). Many cognitive processes have
been characterised from the perspective of prediction, (Bubic et al.,
2010), or expectation (Huron, 2007). For example, anticipation
appears especially important in music, where counterbalancing it
with surprise is used by musicians for evoking emotional responses
to their compositions (Huron, 2007).
Interestingly, the need to expand the reactive modelling to
account for anticipatory processes has been steadily gaining trac-
tion in theories of physiological regulation (Sterling, 2004). There,
the traditional model of homeostatic regulation determined think-
ing about physiology. It amounted to interpreting physiological
regulation in terms of keeping the internal physiological vari-
ables set to some constant ‘optimal’ values by minimising their
departures from the set point, treated as error terms. In contrast,
allostasis proposes that the aim of the physiological regulation is
to adjust the internal milieu to promote survival under natural
selection. In order to achieve this efﬁciently, the regulation should
prevent errors rather than minimise them; a change of emphasis
embracing anticipation. In fact, allostasis has been originally pro-
posed as the process of regulation of internal milieu in response
to social interactions, placing it squarely as a physiological basis of
social cognition (Schulkin, 2011). This should not be surprising, if
one considers the complexity and variability of social interactions.
Reactive (homeostatic) regulations would probably lag behind fast
changing social context and anticipatory regulation of inherently
slow feedback loops based on hormonal regulation may  promote
more meaningful social interactions.
Social cognition must arise from the intersection of neuroen-
docrine regulation and action understanding. The latter, in context
of motion understanding, has been frequently accounted for by
invoking the concept of a mirror neurone system, which is sup-
posed to ﬁre whether we engage in a motor action or simply
observe the action in others. Although very appealing to the the-
ories of social interaction, this is still a somewhat controversial
concept attracting scrutiny of the collected data analysis, interpre-
tation or consistency of the paradigm (Pascolo and Budai, 2013).
One of the sticking points is timing. Pascolo’s scrutiny of some of
the original data from papers published by Rizolatti and Galese
as well as his analysis of reaction times of top athletes suggest
that the usual interpretation of embodied simulation (mirroring)
should be replaced with action anticipation. This is a reinterpre-
tation shared by Maldonato and Dell’Orco (2013) who contend
that mirror neurones may  be involved in anticipation of motor
actions which confers on the other agency similar to that of the
perceiver in lieu of shared motor repertoire and physical charac-
teristics.
Anticipation is not exclusive to the animal world. Judith Rosen
discusses a number of examples of anticipatory behaviour in plants
(Rosen, 2009). What is more unexpected is that such behaviours
seem to be also present in microorganisms such as bacteria,
(Freddolino and Tavazoie, 2012; Mitchell et al., 2009), or yeast
(Dhar et al., 2012). Dhar et al. (2012), discuss different mechanisms
2 BioSys
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hat can help microorganisms orient towards the future. One of
hem is anticipation, where the unicellular organisms use the cur-
ent environmental state to prepare themselves for the signalled
mminent environmental change. E. Coli, for example, in response to
n abrupt increase of ambient temperature starts expressing genes
daptive for a subsequent decrease in oxygen levels. Yeast exposed
o heat stress is better prepared for the subsequent oxidative stress.
reddolino concludes that these examples indicate the limitation
f the often invoked homeostatic principle and proposes a pre-
ictive dynamic framework to account for such cellular behaviour
Freddolino and Tavazoie, 2012).
Some remarks on microbial anticipation are in order. The
roblem with accounting for this phenomenon does not lie with
omeostasis per se, which amounts to the ability to maintain
teady internal state based on available information, but with the
ewtonian conception of causality within which homeostasis is
sually formulated. The same principle could as well be formulated
ith the organism including predicted future information in its
ttempts to maintain its internal state. Another observation is that
n examples of anticipatory behaviour in microorganisms it seems
nticipatory capacity amounts to microorganisms harnessing tem-
oral correlations between different environmental variables. Such
emporal regularities allow the organism to act in a reactive mode
o the current state of the environment as if it actually used the
uture environmental states to determine the state of its gene reg-
latory network. This account shares some similarities with Rosen’s
eﬁnition of anticipatory systems. Applying his deﬁnition here, the
odel would be the microorganism’s ambient temperature sen-
or and the causal entailments in the environment would amount
o e.g. the movement of E. Coli through a digestive system. The
ystem, the gene regulatory network, changes its state using infor-
ation from the temperature sensor. However, anticipation here
s a function of the dynamic coupling between the organism and
he environment. This form of anticipation may  appear when envi-
onmental regularities imply clear temporal correlations between
ifferent environmental variables; if an organism is able to harness
uch regularities, there is no need to generate an explicit inter-
al prediction of the future environmental state. It seems plausible
hat similar mechanisms may  account at least for some cases of
lant anticipatory behaviour; a sentiment clearly shared by Louie
2010).
This brings about a number of questions about the types of antic-
patory behaviours observed in nature. The preceding discussion
escribes very different situations and different organisms engag-
ng in behaviours orienting themselves towards the future but the
uestion of the underlying explanation need not always have the
ame answer. In what sense are predictions or expectations antic-
patory? Must they always reduce to internal predictive models
n Rosen’s sense? Or perhaps in some circumstances is it possible
hat the organisms employ a weaker form of anticipation based on
imulation? Does the empirical evidence conﬁrm existence of inter-
al predictive models directly or is the evidence only consistent
ith the functional outcomes of such models? After all, the exist-
nce of precise models may  amount to a huge demand in terms of
heir implied capabilities and structure; simulations may  be easier.
irst steps towards a taxonomy of anticipatory couplings and their
ossible occurrence in neural systems are discussed in Nasuto and
ayashi (2015).
Regardless of the potentially nuanced answers to the above
uestions, in the sciences operating within the traditional New-
onian framework, anticipatory behaviours are accounted for
nvoking ‘models’, which appear to be more akin to Rosen’s def-
nition of simulation (simulation and model are distinct in Rosen’s
heory; the differences are subtle although pivotal for Rosen’s con-
lusions). Stepp and Turvey object to such representation hungry
ature of predictive computational accounts in cognition (Stepptems 148 (2016) 22–31
and Turvey, 2010). Troubled with computational models’ inabil-
ity to bridge the gap between low level and cognitive processes
(even if they may  appear, a posteriori, for any given data, as ade-
quate descriptions), they propose to shift the emphasis from the
representation-based predictive models to ‘orienting towards the
future’ resulting from the coupling between the organism and its
environment.
Bickhard takes into consideration theories postulating the
brain’s ability to generate predictions within probabilistic frame-
work (Bickhard, 2016). Their scope has been extended to general
theories of brain inference, most often claiming that brains perform
a Bayesian inference. Typically, such ‘predictive brain’ theories rely
on the generative probabilistic models for obtaining predictions of
future states. Bickhard contends that such theories provide an inad-
equate account of the emergence of representation or normativity
as, like in other computational and information processing mod-
els, these are arbitrarily imposed by the external observer rather
than intrinsically emerging properties. Bickhard, too, postulates
that the key to account for such properties is dynamic coupling
or interaction between the organism and its environment and the
organisms ability to anticipate interaction ﬂow at different levels,
with normativity emerging from the thermodynamic properties of
the system.
Similar issues plague approaches attempting to account for
motor control with the use of internal models. Theoretical con-
trol paradigms introduced in engineering are often deﬁned in
a way  that is not guided by the modelling requirements of
any speciﬁc process being observed – they are simply arbitrary
recipes built in a modular way  from blocks put together in such
a way  as to ascertain a desired trajectory of the control plant.
The main prerogative of such an approach is ascertaining that
the obtained control would provably enjoy pragmatically impor-
tant characteristics, such as controllability, stability, robustness
etc., which is feasible owing to universal design principles. This
has to be contrasted with the dynamical systems approach to
modelling coupled systems, where mathematical formalism is
trying to represent the physical nature of coupling mechanisms
ﬁrst and foremost without imposing an a priori control theo-
retic model. Surely, we  can impose control strategies onto the
observed dynamically coupled systems, and often obtain a good ﬁt
to experimental data but this is more akin to (dynamic) statistical
regression than to modelling the dynamical couplings from the ﬁrst
principles.
The emerging view from the current paper and the taxonomy of
anticipatory processes (Nasuto and Hayashi, 2015), suggests that
accounts based on dynamics of biological processes and their cou-
pling to the external environments could have a better chance of
capturing the essence of biological basis of cognitive processes,
more so than computational interpretation of such processes which
should generally come later. More speciﬁcally, after Rosen and oth-
ers, it seems that very speciﬁc anticipatory dynamical couplings
may  constitute a fundamental mode of existence of living systems
that is responsible for their distinctive properties, differentiating
them from inanimate and inert matter.
The building blocks providing a basis for anticipatory coupling
emerging from the discussion presented in Nasuto and Hayashi
(2015) include
• predictive dynamics, and
• anticipating synchronisation.They are based on somewhat different principles and offer
appealing templates of the possible couplings that may be immune
to the objections levelled at computational models or simulations,
as discussed by Bickhard, or Rosen.
BioSys
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. Animats – an experimental platform for cognitive
obotics?
The question remains: where does this leave cognitive robotics?
his section will highlight the possible future direction forward for
obotic systems aimed at elucidating the most fundamental fea-
ures of cognition.
The previous section pointed to the attractive characteristics of
ynamic anticipatory couplings, which may  form a bridge between
ainstream empirical biology and some of the interesting theories
f biological autonomy, as they are formed in terms of ingredients –
ynamics, feedback and delays – commonly found in biological sys-
ems. They also prove attractive from the perspective of ecological
sychology, (Stepp and Turvey, 2010), offering an intriguing possi-
ility of a unifying account, converging with the aims of autopoietic
nactivism.
The important issue to investigate is the role that such cou-
lings may  play and hence the need to test for their presence,
ole and implications. However, whether they, or some further yet
o be identiﬁed processes, are constitutive elements of a biologi-
al autonomous system that is a living organism, is an empirical
uestion that requires the right approaches and experimental
aradigms.
Efforts to construct models of motor action focusing more on
ynamic coupling than on representations, computations or con-
rol have already been pursued in the literature. Most notable have
een the long standing efforts from Scott Kelso and his collabora-
ors, who have been developing models of human motor control,
Kelso, 1997), or from Michael Turvey, one of the main proponents
f ecological psychology and pioneers of dynamical approaches to
otor coordination (Turvey and Fonseca, 2009).
The importance of dynamic couplings and coordination for
ocial embodiment has been in recent years pursued by Tognoli
t al. (2011). More recently, Hayashi proposed further extensions
f Kelso paradigms to the case of mutual motion coordination based
n a dynamic coupling between subjects engaged in the coordina-
ion task, (Hayashi and Sawada, 2013; Hayashi and Kondo, 2013),
nd as a result the interpretation of the motor coordination in terms
f anticipating synchronisation has been put forward in (Blake et al.,
015).
Thus, there is a need for experimental platforms and an inte-
rated cross-disciplinary approach allowing the combination of
nalytical and experimental research for the systematic manipu-
ation of feedback loops and delays to investigate the existence,
ode and processes constitutive of biological autonomy, including
nticipatory couplings.
Such approaches lend themselves most easily to incorporation
n robotic platforms as they do not require any speciﬁc hardware
xtensions or developments, only a particular modelling frame-
ork. Such research has already been ongoing in various robotic
aboratories.
More recent developments in the form of animats – hybrid sys-
ems consisting of cultures of biological neurones controlling, in
 closed loop, robotic bodies may  start alleviating the apparent
eluctance in the mainstream experimental biology to accept the-
retical models of life and cognition as a fundamental framework
or guiding the experimental paradigms and interpreting results.
hey have a potential to blend the research in cellular and systems
euroscience, thus allowing to address the questions on biophysical
nd metabolic underpinnings of neural processes, with approaches
ypical in cognitive robotics, exploring the role of embodiment and
losed loop interactions with the environment. Steve Potter’s group
as one of the ﬁrst to pioneer this platform (DeMarse et al., 2001;
akkum et al., 2004). Few groups have also pursued this line of
esearch (Shahaf et al., 2008; Novellino et al., 2007; Tessadori et al.,
012; Warwick et al., 2010).tems 148 (2016) 22–31 29
It is worth emphasising here that in spite of the presence of a real
biological culture controlling, in a closed loop, a robotic device, cur-
rent animat platforms do not yet escape criticisms levelled against
cognitive robotics, as the construction of the closed loop of these
systems still conforms to a formal mechanistic and externally arbi-
trarily interpretable computation, and they suffer lack of closure to
efﬁcient causation (Nasuto and Bishop, 2012).
In spite of this negative result, the animat nevertheless offers
a very promising experimental platform for investigating fun-
damental questions about the nature of cognition. The animat
platform developed by the University of Reading group uses multi-
ple electrode arrays (MEA) which offer a bidirectional link allowing
to record activity and stimulate cultures of real biological neu-
rones grown on them. The information to and from the culture
is routed via TCP/IP protocol to a computer analysing it and con-
veys instantaneous neural culture activity which is translated
in real time into the actuation of a robotic device. The actua-
tors’ commands are sent to the robot via wireless link and the
resultant change of the robot’s state translates into concomitant
changes of its sensor readings, as the robot probes the environ-
ment while exploring it. The sensory information is routed back
to the MEA  headstage and is there converted into the electri-
cal stimulations delivered via the MEA  electrodes to the culture,
thus closing the feedback loop. The 64 MEA  electrodes offer a
possibility to investigate meso-scale processes, including the spa-
tiotemporal patterns of activity and their modiﬁcations due to
maturation, or electric or chemical stimulation. This offers an excel-
lent opportunity to have very good access to the neural system
and to investigate the processes that may  conﬁrm, or disprove,
the existence of particular constituent characteristics of biological
autonomy.
The culture activity, though complex, is not entirely random in
spite of the seemingly random nature of its structural connectivity
(Downes et al., 2012). In fact, the functional connectivity patterns
seem to follow a speciﬁc progression as the culture matures exhibit-
ing the emergence of small world networks. The complex networks
corresponding to functional connectivity are not static but undergo
complex dynamic transitions (Spencer et al., 2010, 2011, 2012).
Thus, already such simple neural systems show the organisational
capacity that Singer proposed to be underpinning the relational
codes, (Singer, 1999), and Varela postulated as underlying con-
scious perception (Varela et al., 2001).
The spatiotemporal patterns of culture activity also show hall-
marks of transient metastable state transitions (Xydas et al., 2011).
This may be the complementary characteristic of evolving complex
network dynamics and may  allow for ﬂexible switching between
different behaviour patterns or percepts, which are the most con-
sistent with the incoming input (Kelso, 1997).
As highlighted earlier, in addition to the characterisation of
organised mesoscale electrophysiological activity, the animat plat-
form also allows to interrogate the neurobiological properties of
cultures using standard neuroscience approaches. To this end, the
presence and responses of cholinergic synapses characterised by
our group Hammond et al. (2013), also indicate a nonrandom
arrangement akin to that found in vivo. Acetylcholine is an inter-
esting chemical used in the brain as both neurotransmitter and
neuromodulator, i.e. it is able to contribute to transmission of
information at chemical cholinergic synapses as well as to modu-
late such transmission at other synapses. Emergence of functional
cholinergic circuits may  indicate that the cultures retain poten-
tial to support cognitive processes in which acetylcholine has been
implicated, such as memory or attention. This opens an exciting
prospect of future experiments, in which the relative role of, and
interactions between, the closed loop environmental coupling via
animat robotic body and the cholinergic system modulations of
culture activity can be explored.
3 BioSys
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. Conclusions
Given their entrenchment in a Newtonian mechanistic frame-
ork, neither current cognitive robotics nor biology or classical
ognition can escape the mechanistic dead end.
The problems with the computational accounts of cognition,
ncluding a hybrid analogue-discrete one of the cognitive robotics
lk, are inherited from the dualistic conception of reality developed
n western philosophy and, at least in part, from the mechanistic
ewtonian causality developed in physics that is widely accepted
s the ultimate explanatory methodology for inanimate and as well
s living systems.
The apparent congruence of computational accounts with the
lassical physics framework may  explain why the computational
heories of mind are so dominant. Another, but not unrelated, rea-
on is epistemological. The traditional sciences are typically so
ocused on looking into the past and describing what has already
appened in order to account for data that have been collected in
ery speciﬁc circumstances, that the need to account for the capac-
ty of organisms to deal with novel, future hence unconstrained
ituations, where the mechanism of anticipation can actually be
roperly assessed, has been largely exercised away from the tradi-
ional scientiﬁc experimental paradigm. We  need to rethink both
he foundations and the mode of collecting experimental evidence
n order to start closing the gap between the theoretical concept of
nticipation and scientiﬁc practice in experimental sciences.
The theory put forward by Rosen and others, if true, offers a
ay out. By properly accounting for the living organisms’ abil-
ty to ‘orient themselves towards the future’, through exploiting
he anticipatory couplings and appropriate systemic complexity, it
ffers a framework that may  be able to reconcile philosophy with
cience into a complete explanatory natural science.
In order to fulﬁll its ambitions, cognitive robotics will have
o move beyond the current hybrid symbolic-analogue compu-
ational framework and platforms and embrace new platforms
hat may  enable it to elucidate the nature of autonomy and goal
riented behaviour. Animats, part-neurobiological, part-robotic
ybrids, belong to a class of experimental platforms offering ability
o combine experimental approaches used in traditional cellular
euroscience, with investigation of mesoscale level dynamics of
eural systems and sensorimotor accounts characteristics of cog-
itive robotics. It is this ability for simultaneous probing of different
evels of embodiment and their mutual interactions that offers
xciting possibility to advance our understanding of natural auton-
my and the biological basis of cognition.
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